The objective of this paper is to study a model of voting with multiple candidates in which the voters choose the time in which they cast their votes. By voting late a voter can condition his vote on which candidates are still viable. By voting early a voter can reduce the …eld of viable candidates. It turns out that the latter factor can be harmful: while the likelihood that future voters vote for one's favorite candidate increases, so does the likelihood that they vote for one of the remaining viable opponents, and the latter e¤ect can be dominant.
Introduction
We study a simple model of voting in which voters choose the time in which they cast their votes. Our main objective is to study how the preferences of voters a¤ect the temporal structure of voting. We highlight a particular strategic disadvantage of "early voting" in the presence of multiple candidates: narrowing down the …eld of competitors induces subsequent voters to vote either for early voters's preferred candidate or for her opponents, and the latter negative e¤ect can dominate the former positive one. More speci…cally, we identify in a particular parametrized model when sequential or simultaneous voting will occur.
Several institutions present instances of sequential voting, with either exogenous or endogenous timing. In many legislative bodies, voting takes place sequentially. US presidential primaries are a particularly interesting example of sequential voting since each state decides the date of its own election.
Momentum or bandwagons e¤ects are generally held to be the main manifestation of the di¤erence between simultaneous and sequential voting. Such e¤ects underscore the advantages of early voters over later voters in the determination of the election outcome. Momentum e¤ects can arise from two distinct forces that interact in sequential voting. The …rst is strategic. As votes are cast sequentially, some candidates may …nd their chances of winning signi…cantly reduced, and some voters may decide to shift their votes in favour of candidates that are more likely to succeed. The second is informational. Early voting can signal the quality of the candidates to later voters.
In this paper, we abstract from issues pertinent to the signalling of information about the valuation of candidates by assuming that the preferences of the voters are independent. We study an election with three candidates in which voting consists of two stages. In the …rst, "timing game," stage, prior to the preferences being realized, voters choose simultaneously the period in which they will cast their votes. In the second, "voting game," stage, the preferences are realized privately and voting takes place according to the order chosen in the …rst stage. In the voting game voters in later periods observe the votes expressed by the voters in earlier periods. The candidate that obtains the majority of votes wins the election and ties are broken by a fair lottery.
We focus on the trade-o¤ between two incentives that guide the strategic considerations of voters with respect to the temporal dimension of voting. On the one hand, a later voter has lower chances of wasting a vote as she acquires better knowledge about the likelihood of victory of the candidates. On the other hand, an early voter can in ‡uence the outcome of the election by a¤ecting the probability of victory of some candidates in later periods.
In particular, voting early in ‡uences the …eld of candidates and can keep one's candidate viable and make others unviable. We demonstrate a novel insight into the nature of sequential voting: if later voters persist in voting for their favorite candidate despite low chances of victory, early voting has a strategic disadvantage. In particular, if voters use voting strategies that we call persistent, that is, they vote for their preferred candidates as long as these candidates have a positive chance of winning, all equilibria in the …rst stage are equivalent to simultaneous voting. The reason is that, with such voting behavior, voting for one's favorite candidate, say A, in the …rst period can only be advantageous by making another candidate, say B, unviable and thus inducing voters for whom B was the favorite and A the second best to switch to A. But voters for whom B was the favorite and C the second best would also be induced to switch to C. While these two forces might seem to cancel one another, it turns out that the losses are more signi…cant than the gains. Thus, when voters continue to vote for their favorite candidate so long as she might win, shrinking the …eld is detrimental and voters have no incentives to vote early. More precisely, the paper focuses on simple strategies for which voting (but not necessarily timing) is pure and symmetric across voters and candidates (see Section 4 for a formal de…nition). We show (Theorem 1) that when restricting attention to simple persistent strategies, if the number of voters is at least six, then all equilibria are equivalent in terms of the outcome to one in which everyone votes in the last period. The restriction to persistent voting is consistent with equilibrium behavior if the value of every voter's second-best candidate is low compared to the favorite candidate. However, if the second-best candidate's value is close to the value of the favorite candidate equilibria in simple strategies cannot be persistent and must involve voting in multiple periods. (Theorem 2 and Corollary 1). Thus, we are able to link some preference environments to sequential or simultaneous voting.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we brie ‡y discuss the related literature. The model and results are contained in Sections 3, 4, 5 and 6. In Section 7, we discuss possible extensions. The Appendix contains some of the proofs.
Related Literature
The literature on sequential voting has mostly dealt with the issue of information aggregation in binary elections. Dekel and Piccione (2000) study a model in which voting is sequential and show that, in symmetric environments with two candidates, the symmetric equilibria in simultaneous voting are also equilibria in any sequential structure. Battaglini (2005) shows that, with abstention and costly voting, the above inclusion fails and the set of equilibria in simultaneous and sequential voting can be disjoint. Fey (1996) and Wit (1997) study a two-signal, common-value environment in which herd-cascade equilibria exist. Morton and Williams (1999) …nd theoretical and laboratory evidence that later voters use the information transmitted by earlier voters. Callander (2007) shows the existence of "bandwagons" when the number of voters is in…nite and voters have a desire to conform with the majority. Battaglini et al. (2007) compare the equity, information aggregation, and e¢ ciency of simultaneous and sequential voting rules when voting is costly and information is incomplete. Ali and Kartik (2010) construct equilibria in which voters vote sincerely and that exhibit momentum e¤ects. Hummel (2012) studies sequential equilibria with three candidates, where voters'preferences are correlated. First period outcomes are informative about later behavior and lead to equilibria where later voters do not vote for candidates who do poorly early as they know their chances are slim.
Knight and Schi¤ (2010) study polling data from US presidential elections and …nd that early voters have signi…cantly more in ‡uence than late voters. Deltas et al. (2010) provide a framework for analyzing the trade-o¤ between learning about the candidates' quality (valence) and coordination in primary elections. They simulated various types of sequential elections using estimated structural parameters and showed that sequential elections in which candidates remain in the race yield the highest expected valence.
The theoretical literature on multi-stage voting also includes Sloth (1993) , who studies sequential voting with perfect information and shows that the subgame perfect equilibria of roll-call voting are closely related to sophisticated equilibria of simultaneous voting, and Bag et al. 3 . 1 The function f ( ) is symmetric across the candidates and assigns zero probability to ties. In one special case that we will consider in this paper, each voter's preferences are a random selection of permutations of (1; x; 0), for …xed x 2 (0; 1). We will refer to this case as to the x-model.
Voting consists of two stages: a timing, and then a voting, stage. In the timing stage, before the preferences are realized, voters choose simultaneously the period t 2 f1; 2g in which they will cast their votes. 2 This decision is assumed to be irrevocable. In the second, voting, stage, preferences are realized privately and voting takes place according to the order decided in the timing stage. Voters know the timing stage decisions of all voters and, at their time of voting in the second stage, know the earlier votes. The election is won by the candidate that obtains the majority of votes. Ties are decided by a fair lottery.
To de…ne the voting stage strategies of the voters, let = f1; 2g N be the set of all possible timing-stage outcomes, i.e., speci…cations of who votes when. For ! 2 , let t i (!) be the period in which player i votes, H 2 (!) = fA; B; Cg jfi:t i (!)=1gj be the set of possible realizations of votes in period 1, and H 1 (!) the empty history. A voting-stage strategy for player i is a collection
to , the set of probability distributions over fA; B; Cg.
Equilibria
Throughout the paper we focus on equilibria that in the voting stage involve strategies that are pure and symmetric across candidates and across voters; we call these simple voting-stage strategies. Formally de…ne n 1 J to be the total number of votes received by candidate J in period 1, J = A; B; C. 1 The symmetry assumption is important for our results. 2 The number of periods is chosen solely for simplicity. See Section 6. If the choice of timing was made after preferences were realized then the game would be quite di¤erent. We think that our approach to timing is more realistic and interesting; for instance, it seems to match primaries better.
Given a pro…le of voting-stage strategies s, let s(!) denote the N -tuple (s 1 (!); :::; s N (!)). The pro…le s is symmetric across voters if the strategies depend only on the number of voters in each period and are identical for voters in the same period, i.e., if s( !) = s(!) for any permutation and any ! 2 . Given a pro…le s that is symmetric across voters, let t s (N 1 ) be the expected payo¤ of a voter of period t given that N 1 voters vote in period 1. A voting-stage strategy pro…le is symmetric across candidates if for any ! 2 , the strategy of each voter i maps (after the appropriate reordering) every permutation of the triple (n
to an identical permutation of its image in . 3 We now provide two elementary existence results for the timing-game stage when voting-stage strategies are symmetric across voters. Given a pro…le of voting-stage strategies s, de…ne a timing-stage Nash equilibrium (induced by s) as a Nash equilibrium of the game in which the strategy space in the voting stage is restricted to the singleton s.
Proposition 1 Given any pro…le s of voting-stage strategies that is symmetric across voters, the game has a timing-stage Nash equilibrium in pure strategies. Moreover, if ) it is a timing-stage Nash equilibrium for everyone to vote in the second period. Otherwise, de…neÑ 1 be the largest
. It is trivial to see thatÑ 1 voters choosing the …rst period is indeed a timing-stage Nash equilibrium since
. The second part of the proposition follows by repeating the argument for N 1 X.
Remark 1 For a second existence result, note that if we …x any s that is symmetric across voters then the timing game is symmetric hence has a symmetric timing-stage equilibrium (possibly in mixed strategies).
Simultaneous voting
Our goal is to gain insights into the relationship between the preference of voters and the timing of voting. As discussed, late voters may bene…t from being informed about some of the votes; and early voters may bene…t from in ‡uencing the behavior of late voters. One di¢ culty in deriving results about the relationship between preferences and timing is the well-known feature of many voting models that voters can coordinate their behavior in an unappealing manner. To see this observe that in the x-model a sequential equilibrium with simple voting-stage strategies and sequential voting is easily obtained for any x 2 (0; 1) when voters vote (i) for the preferred candidate in the …rst period, and (ii) for the most preferred candidate among the (possibly unique) leading candidates in the second period when
an optimal voting strategy for the (single) second-period voter that is symmetric across candidates is easily ascertained. Obviously, given the above voting-stage pro…le, it cannot be an equilibrium that all voters vote in period 2 as the most preferred candidate of a unique …rst-period voter wins with certainty. Existence of sequential voting in pure strategies then follows by Proposition 1, and in symmetric strategies by Remark 1. Note that this observation also provides an existence proof in the x-model for equilibria with simple second-stage strategies.
In this section, we sidestep the above problem of undesirable voting coordination rather bluntly by …xing the voting-stage strategies so that voters vote for their favorite candidate so long as it is possible she might win and focus on equilibrium behavior in the timing stage. Formally, given a realization of votes in the …rst period, a candidate J is said to be second-period viable if J wins the election with strictly positive probability when all voters in the second period vote for J. A voting-stage strategy is said to be persistent if, when voting in the …rst period it votes for the candidate with the highest valuation and, when voting in the second period, it votes for the viable candidate with the highest valuation. The game in which the set of voting strategies is restricted to persistent strategies is called a P-voting game. Note that persistent voting strategies are simple: pure and symmetric across voters and candidates.
The assumption that voting is persistent is consistent with equilibrium behavior when preferences are such that the di¤erence in valuations between the most preferred and the second most preferred candidate is su¢ ciently large for all realizations. For example, in the x-model persistence is consis-tent with equilibrium behavior when x is small. Since the number of voters and candidates is …nite, the set of possible realizations of votes is also …-nite. Hence, the increase in the probability of victory of a viable candidate from receiving one extra vote is bounded from below by a strictly positive number. By contrast for large x, persistent strategies are not consistent with equilibrium behavior; this follows because, for some realization of …rst-period votes, a voter whose favorite candidate is viable but behind the second-best candidate votes for his second-best candidate if x is close enough to one. The intuition is that, when x is close to one, a voter wishes to minimize the chances of winning of the least preferred candidate and can do so by voting for whoever between the other two candidates is leading. This will be shown formally in Lemma 1 in the next section.
The following example shows that persistence is not enough to rule out sequential voting. It constructs a sequential-voting equilibrium in a P-voting game that is equilibrium is distinct from a simultaneous-move equilibrium (which also exists in this case, and is strictly worse from the perspective of one player).
Example 1
Consider the x-model and suppose that N = 5 and that 4 voters vote in the …rst period. The behavior of a voter in the last period di¤ers from the behavior in simultaneous voting and a¤ects the outcome only when the candidate with the highest valuation obtains zero votes in the …rst period and the other two candidates get 2 votes each. 4 The expected utility of a …rst-period voter conditional upon such realizations is
. 5 This is also the expected utility of all voters when they move simultaneously. However, the utility of the second-period voter with a persistent voting strategy is higher than in simultaneous voting as the candidate valued x wins with certainty when the most preferred candidate is not viable. To see that this is indeed an equilibrium, note that a …rst-period voter is indi¤erent between voting in the …rst or in the second period as, by moving to the second period, voting will be equivalent in outcome to simultaneous voting. 6 The next theorem shows that this example is very special. If N 6, sequential voting cannot be an equilibrium outcome.
Theorem 1 Suppose that N 6. Any P-voting game has an equilibrium in which all voters choose to vote in the second period. Moreover, all P-voting equilibria are equivalent in outcome to this equilibrium.
Proof: See Appendix.
The intuition behind this result is simple despite its long proof. The events in which a candidate ceases to be voted for are exactly those in which that candidate, say candidate C, has no chance of winning the election. Therefore, one cannot save one's favorite candidate by voting early. The question remains whether one can facilitate coordination on one's favorite candidate by voting early and making another candidate unviable. Conditional upon the event of C, say, becoming unviable, voting is e¤ectively binary in that only two candidates can win the election. However in a binary election, the utility of a voter is decreasing in the number of voters as her in ‡uence gets diluted. Having some voters switch from C to A or B with equal probabilities is then equivalent to increasing the number of voters in a binary election. Hence, a voter is better o¤ by voting in later periods and allowing candidates that are not viable to receive votes.
This analysis clearly relies on the symmetry of the candidates. Nevertheless, it helps clarify and highlight the general point that decreasing the …eld of candidates can be disadvantageous as it facilitates focusing not only on one's preferred candidate, but also on that candidate's opponents. While we do not develop this, it is clear that with more candidates this disadvantage would persist.
Sequential voting
In this section, we will investigate when sequential voting is an equilibrium; naturally this will require that voters in the voting stage switch their vote away from their preferred candidate at times when she is still viable. Proposition 1 implies that a su¢ cient condition for the existence of equilibria with sequential voting when voting-stage strategies are symmetric across voters and candidates is that, if N 1 = n 1 J = 1, second-period voters vote for J with a probability higher than 1 3 .
Before turning to the proof of this theorem we state a corollary.
Corollary 1
Consider the x-model. If x is su¢ ciently close to one, there exists an " < 1 such that in any (mixed strategy) sequential equilibrium with simple voting-stage strategies the probability of all players voting in the same period is bounded above by ".
In particular if x is large then there is an " 0 < 1 that bounds from above the probability of any player choosing to move in either period in all symmetric equilibria. The corollary follows because otherwise there is a sequence of simple mixed-strategy sequential equilibria whose limit involves all players playing in the same period, and one can see that this limit is inconsistent with Theorem 2. (The corollary can also be proven directly along the lines of the proof of Theorem 2 below, but instead of using the special case of Remark 2 used in the proof, using the full strength of Lemma 1 and considering all possible timing-stage outcomes.)
To prove Theorem 2 we make use of the following result. Let r C (n A ; n B ) be the probability of victory of C conditional upon the information that n A voters have voted for A, n B voters for B, N 1 n A n B for C, and the remaining voters vote for candidate J with probability e J . The next lemma states that if e A e B , then -conditioning upon candidates having at least 2 more votes for A than for B -changing the vote for B into a vote for A weakly decreases the probability of victory of C, and if C's probability of winning was interior then it strictly decreases that probability.
Lemma 1
Suppose that e A e B .
1. If n A 1 > n B then r C (n A ; n B ) r C (n A 1; n B + 1)
2. If n A 1 > n B and 0 < r C (n A ; n B ) < 1 then r C (n A ; n B ) < r C (n A 1; n B + 1)
Remark 2 In particular r C (2; 0) < r C (1; 1), i.e., if there is one vote each for A and B then switching from B to A decreases the likelihood of C winning.
Proof. See Appendix.
Proof of Theorem 2:
If all voters vote in the same period, simple votingstage strategies vote for the highest valued candidate. Hence, there does not exist an equilibrium in which all voters vote in the …rst period since one voter would be better o¤ moving to the second period. (To see this consider the event that votes are evenly split between one's worst and middle candidate, with either zero or one vote for one's favorite. Then by waiting one increases expected utility as instead of wasting one's vote on one's favorite candidate, one increases from 1/2 to 1 the likelihood of one's second favorite rather than one's worst candidate succeeding.) We need to show that if they all vote in the second period, one voter will move to the …rst period. Consider for simplicity the realization of votes (n 1. Voters may vote for either B or C and cease voting for A. For this type of strategies and x close to one, it is optimal for a voter to switch to the …rst period and vote for the lowest valued candidate as, for N 4, the probability of victory of this candidate drops to zero.
2. Voters may choose persistent voting strategies. For x su¢ ciently close to one, a voter maximizes the expected payo¤ by minimizing the probability of victory of the candidate with the lowest valuation. Then, after an A vote in the …rst period, by Lemma 1, and in particular by Remark 2, it is a strict best reply to vote for A when valued x (assuming everyone else votes for their favorite candidate). Hence persistent strategies are not an equilibrium.
3. Third, voters with preferences (1; x; 0), (x; 1; 0), (1; 0; x), and (x; 0; 1) vote for A and voters with the remaining preferences vote for the highest valued candidate. (It is clear that that by Lemma 1 this pro…le of strategies is an equilibrium for x close to one, but this is not needed for our conclusion.) In this case, the probability that the second-period voters vote for A after the realization of votes (n The intuition behind this theorem is as follows. When only one voter votes in the …rst period, if x is close to one, there does not exist an equilibrium in which voters in the second period use persistent voting strategies. Thus the result from the preceding section does not apply. If the voters coordinate in equilibrium by ceasing to vote for the candidate receiving the …rst period vote, then it is optimal for one voter to move to the …rst period and vote for the option with zero value. If voters vote for the leading candidate with probability higher than 1 3 , it is optimal for one voter to move to the …rst period and vote for the option with the highest value. Thus at least one voter moves to the …rst period.
Arguments similar to those used in the proof of Lemma 1 establish that, when x is close to one, following some …rst-period outcomes it is not optimal to vote for the most preferred candidate in the second period. Thus, voting behavior is not equivalent to simultaneous voting.
In the x-model with x large, existence of an equilibrium with simple second-stage strategies follows from the example in the …rst paragraph of Section 5. The existence of equilibria that do not involve the perverse coordination that appears there follows from Proposition 1 and Remark 1 using the following pro…le of simple second-period strategies. These equilibria are an example of what might be called satis…cing voting strategies: voting for one's favorite candidate so long as the second-best candidate has fewer votes than the favorite, and voting for the second-best otherwise. That for x large these strategies are an equilibrium for the second period of the voting game given any outcome of the timing game and any outcome of …rst-period voting can be shown using Lemma 2. Moreover, it is easy to see that these strategies cannot be an equilibrium for small x as voting for the second-best candidate as required in part 2 below is not optimal for small enough x.
Example 2
1. If candidate J receives in the …rst period a number of votes strictly less than the other two candidates, J 0 and J", voters in the second period cease voting for J and vote for J 0 or J" with the higher valuation.
2. If in the …rst period candidate J is leading and the other two candidates, J 0 and J", have the same number of votes, a voter in the second period votes for J if J is valued one, for J if J is valued x and at least one other voter votes in the second period, and for J 0 or J" with the higher valuation in the remaining cases.
3. If in the …rst period all the candidates have the same number of votes, voters in the second period vote for the candidate with the highest valuation.
Conclusions and Extensions
The main conclusion of this paper is that for sequential voting to arise endogenously, later voters must shift votes in favor of the second-best candidates when the probability of victory of their favorite candidate is not negligible. If voters desist from voting their favorite candidate only when her probability of victory is very small, voting early has a strategic disadvantage as it decreases the probability of victory of one's favorite candidate. Although our results were proved for the case of three candidates, the intuitions behind them carry over quite naturally to the case of more than three. While we have not veri…ed the formal details, we expect the above results to hold in the latter case. Theorem 1 extends to the case of a …nite but arbitrary number of periods. The proof follows from minor modi…cations of the arguments available in this paper and is not provided. However, when voting has more than 2 periods, the strategic environment is complex and can involve strategies that, at least at …rst glance, appear non-intuitive. For example, strategic voting for the second-best candidate can occur in some periods even when one's favorite is leading. Consider the x-model and suppose that voting takes place in 3 periods. Assume that x = 1 " and that in period 1 the votes for A, B, and 
Also suppose that one voter votes in period
), the period 2 voter obtains a payo¤ equal to zero with probability 1 2 . Note the anti-herding feature in this example: an increase in the number of votes for B can lead a voter to vote for A instead.
Strategic voting can even induce voters to vote for their least preferred candidate. Consider again the x-model for x small and that voting takes 3 periods. The realization of votes in the …rst period is 1 vote for A, N=2 1 votes for C, and none for B. There is only one voter in period 2 and has preferences (1; x; 0). If he votes for A or B, then B is still viable and, if x is small, it is an equilibrium for voters in period 3 to vote for the favorite candidate. Voting for C makes B not viable and hence voters will switch to the preferred candidate between A and C. This can increase the probability of A winning if N is large.
Our results raise some interesting questions for the timing of voting of states of di¤erent sizes. On the one hand, a large state alone could destabilize simultaneous voting by early voting whereas a small state alone may be unable to a¤ect the behavior of later voters. On the other hand, a truly large state may have lower incentives than small states to vote early in the election. A large state could have a signi…cant in ‡uence in determining the choices of later states but, as we have seen in Theorem 1, this can be detrimental to the probability of success of a large state's preferred candidate. A speci…c example demonstrating this possibility is available in the working paper version of this paper; we leave studying the case of asymmetric voters for future work.
Appendix
Proof of Theorem 1: Clearly, it is an equilibrium for all voters to vote in the last period. (One voter moving earlier cannot make any candidate unviable hence there is no bene…t to moving earlier.) Consider an equilibrium in which voting takes place in two periods and that is not equivalent to simultaneous voting. For simplicity in notation, we will assume that if two candidates cease to be viable in period 1, voters vote for their highest valued candidate in period 2. As the outcome is thus determined in period 1 this assumption is inessential.
Consider a voter i who votes in period 1. Without loss of generality, suppose that A is the candidate having the highest valuation for i. We will …rst show that, for any N , i's payo¤ cannot decrease if he decides to vote for A in period 2. This will imply that he is at least as well o¤ if he votes in period 2 for the best viable candidate. We will then show that, for N 6, i's payo¤ must increase if he decides to vote for A in period 2.
Given a …xed number of period 1 voters, consider the events for which, if voter i deviates and votes in period 2, the voting of the other voters is a¤ected. To de…ne such pivotal events, letn 
N n
where J 2 fB; Cg. If (1) and (2) hold for J = B and both A and B are viable then period 2 voters whose most valuable candidate is C vote for their second most valuable candidate (A or B) when voter i votes for A in the …rst period (as then C is not viable by (1)), and vote for C when voter i votes for A in the second period (as then C is viable by (2)). A symmetric explanation holds for J = C. Take 1 such that, forn (1) and (2) hold and both A and B are viable. De…ne the events and de…ne
The following elementary fact is stated without proof.
Fact If (1) and ( We will now show that the probability of A winning conditional on E(k) does not decrease with k. To do so, we will replace one second-period vote for C with a vote for A or B with probability 0:5 each and show that the probability of A winning cannot increase. In particular, we will show that, conditional on E 1 (k), the e¤ect of decreasing k is to weakly increase the probability that A wins. However, for the corresponding event E 2 (k) decreasing k weakly decreases the probability that A wins by an o¤setting amount. Since E 2 (k) is at least as likely as E 1 (k), the overall e¤ect conditional on E(k) of decreasing k is to weakly decrease the probability that A wins. We will then show that for all remaining events withn 1 A n 1 B , the probability of A winning decreases as k decreases.
Letñ A denote the total number of votes for candidate A in period 2 when the vote of voter i is not included, and N 1 the total number of voters in period 1 including voter i. First note that conditional on E(k) and i voting for A in either the …rst or the second period, A wins with probability 1 if
and wins with probability 1=2 if
is even. Note that if it is even for one component event in E(k), it is even for the other component as well. If k is decreased by one, the only N -tuples whose outcome is a¤ected are those in (4) . In this case, the probability of A winning is unchanged when k is decreased by one since the voter who ceases voting for C votes for A with probability 1=2 and B with probability 1=2. Now consider the case of odd
and suppose that one of the voters who vote for C in period 2 switches to A or B with probability 1=2 each. To evaluate the change in the probability of victory of A, in E 1 (k) we need to consider N -tuples for which
and, in E 2 (k),
For the events satisfying W L1 and W L2, if one of the k voters for C switches to voting for A with probability 1=2 and B with probability 1=2, the probability of A winning decreases from 1 to 3=4. For the events satisfying LW 1 and LW 2, the probability of A winning increases from 0 to 1=4.
Since the distribution ofñ A conditional upon
, we have that
By the same token,
Since the symmetry of the binomial distribution also implies that the probability of E 1 (k) cannot exceed the probability of E 2 (k), it can be easily veri…ed that the probability of A winning cannot increase if one of the k second period C-voters switches to A or B with probability 1=2 each. To see this note that the change in the probability of A winning after one of the k second-period voters switches to A or B with probability 1=2 is equal to
Given equations (5), (6) and (7) we have
and since Pr (E 1 (k)) Pr (E 2 (k)) the result follows. In view of the Fact, to conclude that i's payo¤ never decreases when he votes for his highest-valued candidate in period 2, we need to consider …rst period realizations for whichn
In particular, we want to show that, conditional upon the event fn 1 A n 1 B , k voters vote for C in period 2g, the probability of A winning the election decreases with k.
As before, we consider 2 cases. If
) is even and k decreases by one, the N -tuples whose outcome is a¤ected are those in (4). As before, if a voter who ceases voting for C votes for A with probability 1=2, the probability of A winning is unchanged.
If N 1 k n B , the event de…ned by the …rst equality is more likely. For an N -tuple satisfying the …rst equality, decreasing k decreases the probability of A winning from 1 to 3=4. For an N -tuple satisfying the second equality, decreasing k increases the probability of A winning from 0 to 1=4. Hence, decreasing k cannot increase the probability of A winning. Since conditional upon i voting for A, the probabilities of B or C winning the election are identical, voter i is not worse o¤ voting for A in period 2.
We conclude the proof of theorem showing that, if N 6, voter i is strictly better o¤ voting in period 2 for the best viable candidate. since Pr(W L1 j E 1 (1)) = 0 and Pr(LW 1 j E 1 (1)) = Pr (ñ A = N=2 2 j E 1 (1)) = 1 2 Pr (ñ A = N=2 2) : N 6 implies that Pr ñ A = N 2 2 > 0 and, since the probability of E 1 (1) is strictly smaller than the probability of E 2 (1), voter i is strictly better o¤ voting in period 2. since Pr(W L1 j E 1 (2)) = 0 and Pr(LW 1 j E 1 (2)) = Pr (ñ A = (N 5) =2 1 j E 1 (2)) which in turn equals Pr (ñ A = (N 5) =2 1) =4.
When k = 2, Pr ñ A = N 5 2 1 > 0. But k can be equal to 2 if there are at least two voters (excluding i) in period 2, that is, N 7.
Proof of Lemma 1:
We …rst state and prove an intermediate lemma.
Lemma 2 For non-negative integers 1 , 2 and , if 2 1 , 2 + 1 + 1, and for e such that (1 e) e :
Proof of Lemma 2: The di¤erence of the left and right hand sides simpli…es to
(1 e) 1 
